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This paper analyzes the evolution and impact of capital flows in Colombia over the past 
five years. An examination of the nature and composition of the capital flows indicates 
that to large extent they have originated in foreign direct investment, especially in the 
oil and mining sectors. The repercussions of capital flows for the stability and fragility 
of the financial system are also discussed. Finally, some of the challenges faced by the 
authorities in dealing with the implications of capital flows for the conduct of monetary 
and exchange rate policies are presented. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990s Colombia has experienced two prolonged episodes of strong 
capital inflows interceded by an episode of capital flight. The first episode in the 
nineties ended with the “sudden stop” crisis of 1998-1999. This event was 
characterized by the reliance on foreign indebtedness as the primary source of 
external saving, followed by foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio inflows. 
The sudden stop of 1998-1999 was the consequence of the international crisis in the 
capital markets and resulted in the loss of access to the foreign debt markets This 
forced a drastic adjustment in the current account that registered a surplus in 1999, 
after several consecutive years of increasing deficits. 
 
After 2000, the Colombian economy experienced a renewal of capital inflows, 
especially public debt and portfolio inflows, as the economy regained access to the 
international capital markets. This process was interrupted in the second half of 
2002, with the emerging market crisis originated in the Brazilian elections. The last 
episode of capital inflows started in 2004 and has been characterized by a lessened 
dependence on external debt, and a significant increase in FDI. 
 
This paper analyzes the evolution and impact of capital flows in Colombia over the 
past five years. The following section characterizes the nature and composition of 
capital flows. Next, the repercussions of capital flows for the financial system are 
discussed. Finally, some implications of capital flows for the conduct of monetary 
and exchange rate policies are presented. 
 
2.  Characterization of capital flows in Colombia 
 
a.  The current account deficit 
 
Unlike other emerging market economies (EMEs) in the region, Colombia has 
registered an increasing current account deficit over the past years (Table 1).  This 
evolution is related to sizable increases in investment ratios, despite rising saving 
ratios. Both public and private saving have increased, while private investment 
explains the growth of total investment (Table 2). Since 2002, corporate saving 
explains a large fraction of the increase of the saving ratio (Graph 1). In other Latin 
American EMEs, investment and saving ratios have been more stable, and current 
account surpluses have been produced by slight decreases in investment and 
increases in saving (Tables 3 and 4). Like Colombia, Eastern and Central European 
EMEs have recorded growing current account deficits, but in this case, saving ratios 
have remained stable while investment ratios have risen (Tables 3 and 4).   
 
b.  The funding of the current account 
 
The financing of the current account deficit in recent years has increasingly relied 
upon FDI net inflows, although foreign indebtedness remains an important source of 
external savings. Portfolio flows have stayed at low levels and only recently became 
a significant source of foreign funds (Table 5).  
 
The importance of FDI gross flows in the funding of the current account deficit may 
also be appreciated when compared to other countries (Graph 2). At  the beginning   3
of the decade FDI represented 2.9% of GDP, one of the lowest among the largest 
Latin American economies. Between 2004 and 2006, FDI in Colombia surged and 
reached ratios of GDP among the highest in the region (around 6% of GDP). 
 
The recent behavior of FDI flows is different from that of the 1990s. There has been 
a considerable rise in FDI in the oil and mining sectors, as its share of total FDI 
went from 19.6% in the 1990s to 41% in the present decade. FDI in the 
manufacturing sector increased from 22.7% of total FDI in the 1990s to 27.4% in 
the 2000s. However, this number includes the purchases of large Colombian firms 
by foreign investors (close to 40% of total FDI inflows in the last three years). On 
the other hand, FDI in the electric sector, that represented 21.4% of total FDI in the 
1990s, declined to -0.9% in this decade. In the remaining sectors (non-tradables), 
FDI went from 36.3% of total FDI in the 1990s to 32.5% in the 2000s. 
 
The large increase in FDI for the oil and mining sectors is partly related to the 
increases of the international prices of these commodities (Table 6). Also, the more 
favorable contractual conditions for foreign firms to explore and exploit oil fields 
may have attracted additional FDI into that sector. It should be noted that a large 
share of FDI in these sectors is done in the form of imported capital goods. For 
example, in 2006 the “imported component” of FDI in the oil sector amounted to 
20.6%, and 38% in the mining sector. In addition, the sizable inflows of FDI have 
implied increased profit remittances. 
 
Over the past five years FDI by Colombian residents abroad has fluctuated between 
0% and 1.5% of GDP, except for 2005, when the former owners of Bavaria, the 
largest brewery in the country, received stocks from SAB-Miller as partial payment 
for the sale of the corporation (Graph 3). Other outflows of Colombian FDI have 
gone to the electric, beverages, banking and cement sectors. 
 
Public debt inflows increased in the beginning of the decade, but were reduced after 
2004, within a strategy of decreasing the FX exposure of the public sector. In fact, 
in 2005 there were net foreign debt payments by the Government, in an effort to 
help the Central Bank sterilize the monetary effects of FX intervention and alleviate 
the appreciation of the currency. The private sector made net payments of long term 
foreign debt between 1999 and 2004, to reduce its FX exposure. Private foreign 
indebtedness increased again in 2005 and 2007, in response to interest rate 
differentials and the expectation of a currency appreciation (Graph 4). Since public 
debt inflows are mostly of a long term nature, the recently observed reduction in the 
average maturity of external debt is explained by a rise in short term private debt 
(Table 7)    
 
As mentioned earlier, portfolio investment has not been a significant source of 
external saving. Net inflows by non-residents are low and include the resources 
brought in by local investment funds. These do not incorporate indirect position 
taking by off-shore institutions through derivative markets. Net flows by residents 
mainly comprise movements by pension fund managers. These flows are loosely 
associated with interest rate differentials (Graph 5). In the first part of 2007 there 
was a surge in portfolio investment that was explained by the increasing interest rate 
differential and a non-credible discretionary FX intervention by the Central Bank, as 
will be discussed later.      4
 
c.  Volatility of capital flows 
 
It is difficult to assert that capital flows are now more volatile than in the 1990s. 
With the exception of the purchases of Colombian firms in 2005, net capital inflows 
by non-residents do no seem to have become more volatile (Graphs 6 and 7). On the 
other hand, net outflows by private residents show larger volatility since 2000, 
partly related to portfolio movements of pension funds and the effect on Colombian 
FDI of payments received as equity for the sale of Colombian companies to foreign 
investors (Graph 8 and 9). As mentioned earlier, there have been episodes of high 
volatility (“sudden stops”) in 1998-1999 and 2002-2003. Lately, in 2007, the level 
and volatility of portfolio investment rose, as explained above.  
 
 
The Colombian peso volatility has exhibited an increasing trend since 2005 (Graph 
10). Before, it was below average for a sample of floating exchange rate economies. 
Also, the Colombian peso shows episodes of high conditional volatility, although on 
average it is as volatile as the yen or the Chilean peso (Lega et al., 2007, p. 13). 
However, the volatility of the peso is highly persistent and positively related to the 
EMBI (Lega et al., 2007, p. 14, and Kamil, H., 2007, Table 4). FX intervention by 
the Central Bank may have reduced the volatility of the Colombian currency 
between 2004 and 2006, but not afterwards, when the intervention lost its credibility 
and effectiveness (Kamil, 2007). Lower bound restrictions on the net FX cash 
position by banks seem to diminish the volatility of the currency (Lega et al., 2007).   
 
The episodes of heightened volatility are associated with situations in which many 
players in the FX market tend to take the same position. This may be due in part to 
the incentives faced by large agents like pension fund managers. Although these 
institutions are supposed to hold stable, structural positions in several asset markets, 
Graph 11 shows that their FX exposure follows closely the behavior of the exchange 
rate. In addition, Gómez et al. (2006) found that these agents engage in very active 
daily trading in the FX market. More generally, Suárez (2007) presents some 
measures of herding behavior on the part of pension funds and links it to regulatory 
minimum returns. 
 
d.  Role of financial intermediaries in capital flows 
 
Most capital flows are not intermediated by domestic financial institutions (Table 
8). FDI and most foreign debt transactions are done directly by non-financial 
corporations or the government. Financial intermediaries play a role in the case of 
portfolio investment (pension funds) and some private debt. 
 
e.  Foreign participation in asset and derivative markets 
 
In Colombia, foreigners may participate in asset markets (public debt, stocks, bank 
liabilities) by setting up local investment funds (on-shore). These funds are 
relatively small and show a loose relationship with interest rate differentials (Graph 
5). However, non-residents (off-shore) may have indirect exposure to Colombian 
assets through the use of derivatives, f. ex., through non-delivery forward 
sales/purchases of Colombian pesos. This is estimated by means of the FX net 
exposure of financial intermediaries, which act as counterparts of off-shores in the   5
forward market. The latter has experienced substantial growth in the last years 
(Graph 12). There are no other significant derivative markets in Colombia due to 
regulatory restrictions, inadequate accounting rules for non-financial corporations 
and lack of expertise in the valuation of derivative products. 
 
Restrictions on participation of non-residents in real estate markets through local 
investment funds were eased in 1998. Since then, it has increased, but it is still very 
small. The largest figures correspond to 2005 and 2006, when FDI in construction 
and acquisition of real estate property amounted to US$ 150 m per year, less than 
2% of total FDI in those years. 
  
f.  Other sources of information on capital flows 
 
Besides quarterly balance of payments information, in Colombia there is a weekly 
“Foreign exchange cash balance”, with a lag of two weeks. All capital account 
transactions that involve FX movements in the domestic peso-dollar market are 
recorded this statement. It provides a good approximation to some capital flows 
(especially portfolio investment, debt flows and some FDI flows). However, it 
excludes the flows that do not involve FX transactions, most importantly a large part 
of oil-related FDI. Also, the Central Bank calculates the net external asset position 
of financial intermediaries, which includes all cash and derivative FX transactions of 
the financial institutions.  
  
 
3.  Implications of capital flows for the depth of the financial system and its 
resilience 
 
a.  Financial markets 
 
Portfolio investment channeled through on-shore firms (local investment funds) 
represents a small fraction of the outstanding stock of securities both in the 
public bond and the stock markets (Graph 13). However, it has gained 
participation over the past three years. It is difficult to assess the impact of these 
funds on the liquidity of the capital markets, since, despite its relative small size, 
their trading activity may be important and there is no readily available data on 
this. 
 
The effects of external factors on some domestic asset prices are illustrated in 
Graph 14. Since 2002 there is an apparent inverse relationship between the price 
of Colombian foreign debt bonds (“Yankees”), determined by external interest 
rates and sovereign risk premia, and the exchange rate (measured as Pesos per 
US dollar).  Also, there was a positive relationship between the prices of 
domestic and foreign Colombian public bonds (TES) until July, 2006. After that, 
the relationship broke down because Colombian financial institutions realized 
market risk losses on their domestic public bond holdings and started reducing 
their exposure to this risk. This will be described in some detail in the next 
section.  In some sub-periods, there seems to be an inverse relationship between 
the Central Bank policy rate and the price of domestic public bonds. 
   6
For its part, stock prices exhibited sustained growth between 2003 and 2006. 
Their relationship with the prices of foreign Colombian public bonds (Yankees) 
became closer after 2004, while there has been a clear inverse relation with the 
exchange rate in the same period (Graph 15). 
 
In terms of volatility, the coefficient of correlation between the conditional 
variances (GARCH) of the daily returns on Yankees and the returns on domestic 
public bonds (TES) is around 30% for the period 2000-2007. A similar 
coefficient is obtained for the case of Yankees and stock prices. The correlation 
of conditional volatilities of the returns on the exchange rate and the Yankees is 
much lower (6.6%). In sum, there is a significant influence of external factors on 
the level of domestic asset prices and, in some cases, on their volatility. There 
has been no new hedging instruments linked to capital flows in Colombia due to 
regulatory restrictions. 
 
Domestic asset markets are integrated. Graph 16 shows the correlation 
coefficients between the daily returns on TES and stock prices (positive), and 
TES and the exchange rate (negative). After July 2002 those correlations became 
stronger. The negative relationship between the exchange rate and stock prices 
has already been noted. In terms of volatility, the correlation between the 
conditional variances of TES and stock price returns is 23%. The value of this 
coefficient is 12.9% for the conditional variances of TES and the exchange rate, 
while a coefficient around 32% is obtained for the conditional variances of stock 
prices and exchange rate returns. 
 
The experience of the current decade shows that Colombian financial markets 
are vulnerable to external shocks. During the second semester of 2002 there was 
a regional emerging market crisis related to the elections in Brazil that led to a 
disruption of domestic asset markets. The crisis caused a rise in the sovereign 
risk premia, a depreciation of the local currency and a flight away from domestic 
assets (TES) by both, financial intermediaries and other agents. The changes in 
sentiment of the markets affected in particular brokerage firms, that were 
leveraging their purchases of TES with bank credit, using the same securities as 
collateral. When commercial banks had the access to the external credit lines 
curtailed and the value of their collateral (Yankees) reduced, they cut the credit 
supply to brokerage firms and increased the demand for dollars. This 
exacerbated the plunge in the prices of TES and the rise of the dollar, as brokers 
had to realize their losses by liquidating their TES holdings.  
 
After the crisis subsided, the market recovered its appetite for TES and, between 
2004 and 2005, financial intermediaries accumulated large holdings of TES 
originated in the efforts by the Government and the Central Bank to reduce the 
FX exposure of the Government and to sterilize the monetary expansion 
resulting from the FX intervention. As a consequence, there was a large increase 
in the exposure of the financial system to market risk, amidst the lack of 
instruments for individual agents to hedge it. Against this background, in the 
second quarter of 2006 two events prompted the realization of possible large 
losses associated with the drop in TES prices. First, the Central Bank modified 
its policy stance in the face of inflationary risks, and second, external 
turbulences reappeared, producing increases in sovereign risk premia. Stock   7
prices also suffered heavy losses, which were compounded by the high leveraged 
positions of some agents. 
 
These episodes show that the vulnerability of capital markets to external events 
stems in part from their structure. In particular, in such situations it may be hard 
to find a substantial group of agents that are willing to take opposite positions to 
market sentiment. This forces the Central bank or the Government to assume this 
role . As mentioned above, pension fund managers, for example, sometimes act 
as traders with a short term time frame, and not as long term investors holding 
stable, structural positions. Also, the low participation of foreigners in domestic 
asset markets may hinder the possibility of having diverse, heterogeneous agents 
in those markets. However, this potential benefit depends on the assumption that 
foreign investors are more diverse and less pro-cyclical than domestic ones. 
 
b.  Financial institutions 
 
Capital inflows do not seem to have an impact on the size of assets and liabilities 
of financial institutions. However, the balance sheets of these intermediaries 
expanded between 2004 and 2007 (Graph 17). This can be explained by the 
large increases in the demand for local assets by residents. Monthly portfolio 
investment outflows by residents went down from US$160 m on average 
between 2000 and 2003 to outflows of US$ 70 m on average between 2004 and 
2007. Broad money demand grew rapidly in the face of large expectations of 
currency appreciation and lower external interest rates and sovereign risk 
premia. Deposits in the financial system increased from 31.2% of GDP in 
December 2003 to 38.2% in December 2006. Estimations of broad money 
demand equations indicate a significant response of this aggregate to shifts in 
interest rate differentials
1.      
 
Regarding the role of on-shore foreign banks in the intermediation of capital 
flows, there is no strong evidence that they are more active than domestic banks. 
Not only depository institutions intermediate a small fraction of capital flows, 
but also the share of total assets represented by external loans intermediated by 
foreign banks is similar to that of domestic banks (Graph 18) The only 
significant difference occurred during the “sudden stop” of the late nineties, 
when domestic banks saw reduced their lines of credit, while foreign banks were 
able to maintain their foreign loan intermediation activities.  
 
c.  Non-financial institutions: 
  
Restrictions on the foreign exchange cash position of financial intermediaries 
imposed in 1999 and 2004 limited the extent to which these institutions could 
                                                 
1 Quarterly VEC estimations of real broad money demand (M3
D/P) for the period 1986-2007 produce the 
following long term equation; 
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Where i corresponds to the nominal return on the financial liabilities included in M3, i
* is the US nominal 
90-day CD rate and 
^
e is the annualized quarterly depreciation rate of the peso. Notice that the coefficient 
of the interest differential term implies that a 1 percentage point increment in the differential is associated 
with a 1.6% increase in the real demand for money in the long run.   8
bring in foreign capital to exploit interest rate arbitrage opportunities. The 
purpose of these restrictions was to curb the size of the appreciation or 
depreciation of the currency. As a result, non financial institutions (not subject to 
the restrictions) stepped in and took advantage of those opportunities. In most 
cases, they worked jointly with a commercial bank and provided the liquidity 
required to arbitrage the interest rate differentials. 
 
However, the FX and forward operations done through this arrangement are 
small relative to size of these markets (Graph 19), and the restrictions on the 
foreign exchange cash position of financial intermediaries are sometimes 
binding or close to it. When this happens, financial institutions are not able to 
take positions in the forward market and the forward premium deviates from the 
interest rate differential
2 (Graph 20) 
 
d.  Foreign investors 
 
It is possible for foreign investors to take positions in the forward market (non 
delivery) to bet on the appreciation (or depreciation) of the peso. This, 
apparently, does not involve any capital inflow. However, the counterpart, 
usually a financial intermediary, seeks to hedge its forward position and there is 
in the end an inflow (outflow) corresponding with the initial position in the 
forward market. The holding of the FX risk, in the case of inflows, has landed 
sometimes on the Central Bank through the FX intervention. 
 
4.  Implications of capital flows for the conduct of monetary and exchange rate 
policies 
 
a.  Effects of capital flows on the exchange rate and the monetary and FX 
policy stance 
 
As indicated above, the nature of the capital inflows into the Colombian 
economy in the past 5 years shows a large “long term” component (Graph 21). 
Elbadawi and Soto (1994) and Alper and Saglam (2000) suggest that 
“permanent” capital flows affect both the real and the nominal exchange rate. 
Hence, it can be posited that the real and nominal appreciation trend of the 
Colombian peso over the past four years can be explained to some extent by the 
long term capital inflows and the declining trend of the country risk premia 
(EMBI). In this sense it should be noted that the peso appreciated after 2004, 
while the US short term interest rates were increasing relative to domestic rates 
(Graph 22). 
 
Although part of the appreciation may be due to the direct effect of the increase 
in terms of trade, the latter also influences capital flows by inducing larger FDI 
(as shown in the first section) and reducing the probability of default of 
commodity-producing economies. 
 
                                                 
2 When the restrictions on the Banks´ FX net cash position (FNCP) get closer to regulatory limits (e.g. 
around zero after 2004), Banks are unable to buy forward US Dollars. Hence, the forward price falls 
below the level implied by the interest rate differential. For this reason, at times we can expect an inverse 
relation between FNCP and the deviation of the forward price from the interest rate differential.    9
Monetary policy in Colombia follows an inflation targeting strategy, whereby 
the exchange rate is a key indicator of monetary conditions and inflationary 
pressures. Thus the monetary policy stance was influenced by the appreciation 
induced by the capital flows. Specifically, the appreciation may have delayed the 
start of the tightening cycle by the central bank. In fact, between 2004 and 2005 
short term interest rates were reduced by 125 basis points, reaching real levels as 
low as 0.7% by October of 2005, even thought capacity utilization was growing 
throughout this period (Graph 23). 
  
 
Later, since April 2006, the monetary policy stance has been tightened in spite of 
the continuing appreciation of the currency, due to the strength of aggregate 
demand and large increases in the supply of credit. The latter were also 
influenced by capital flows. The increased demand for domestic deposits by 
residents, resulting from lower capital outflows, pushed the credit supply by 
financial intermediaries.      
            
Capital flows also had an impact in the stance of FX policy. Concern on the 
level of reserves, the permanence of the appreciation and its effects on some 
tradable sectors led to increased central bank FX intervention. To moderate the 
magnitude of the appreciation, the central bank introduced discretionary 
intervention in the FX market in 2004. This intervention was relatively 
successful until 2006, (Kamil 2007), to the extent that it was not inconsistent 
with current and expected monetary policy actions (Graph 24).  
 
In 2007, rising inflation due to strong aggregate demand pressures and food  
price shocks made it clear that the central bank would have to continue   
increasing interest rates. The credibility of the central bank´s commitment to 
inflation targeting hampered the credibility and effectiveness of FX intervention, 
and as result, portfolio investment flows shot up, discretionary intervention had 
to be abandoned and some capital account measures were taken to isolate the 
exchange rate from movements in the domestic interest rates, as will be 
discussed below.  
 
b.  Sterilization mechanisms and consequences  
 
The intervention of the Central Bank through different mechanisms led to a 
considerable increase in the supply of primary liquidity in the domestic money 
market. In spite of the large increase in real money demand (related to capital 
flows), between 2004 and 2007 the accumulated monetary effects of the FX 
intervention (Col$ 30.3 trillion) surpassed the growth of the demand for 
monetary base (Col$ 12.1 trillion). Without sterilization, this would have pushed 
short term interest rates below the policy rate set by the monetary authorities.  
 
Hence, the Central Bank had to sterilize these excesses of liquidity using the 
following mechanisms: 
•  Sale of international reserves to the Government, which were used to 
service and/or prepay public foreign debt. 
•  Outright sales of Government bonds held by the Central Bank.   10
•  Reduction of the amount of short term liquidity supplied through REPO 
auctions. 
•  Increase of Government deposits in the Central Bank. 
•  Non-reserve deposits of financial institutions at the Central Bank. 
 
The Central Bank used a combination of the abovementioned mechanisms because 
since 1999 it is not allowed, by law, to issue its own securities. Thus, it was forced 
to adjust monetary base through transitory and permanent sales/purchases of 
Government debt. At the time of the largest FX intervention, the outstanding stock 
of Government paper in the Central Bank was not enough to mop up the excesses of 
liquidity. 
 
The use of the first two mechanisms implied an expansion of the public bond 
supply, which was willingly absorbed by the financial intermediaries, particularly 
commercial banks. At the time, the intermediaries expected high capital gains 
caused by declining inflation, stable or decreasing short term interest rates and 
strong capital inflows. As a result, exposure to market risk jumped. In the second 
quarter of 2006, the Central Bank shifted its policy stance and turbulence in the 
international capital markets pushed up sovereign risk premia. Domestic bond prices 
fell sharply, commercial banks suffered losses and reduced their holdings of 
Government securities in favor of loans. Throughout the second semester of 2006, 
credit supply skyrocketed and lending rates declined at the same time as the Central 
Bank was raising its interest rate (Graphs 25, 26 and 27). 
 
The cost of sterilization has not been a pressing issue because the Central Bank 
generates large profits and the opportunity cost of reserve accumulation was not 
sizable, at least in the first years of the intervention, because the interest rate 
differential was relatively low. In addition, the expansion in the demand for 
monetary base reduced the need for sterilization.   
 
c.  Other measures used for managing capital flows 
 
After discretionary FX intervention was abandoned in April 2007, some measures 
were taken in May to mitigate the impact on the exchange rate from the increases of 
the policy interest rates. First, the reserve requirement on external debt, widely used 
in the 1990s, was reactivated seeking to discourage short term foreign indebtedness. 
It forces agents to deposit in the Central Bank 40% of the external loan for a period 
of six months. The deposit can be denominated in US dollars or Colombian pesos 
and may be withdrawn at a discount established by the Central Bank.  
 
Second, the Government put in place a similar requirement on portfolio investment. 
Third, since the first two measures did not prevent other agents, like pension fund 
managers, from exploiting arbitrage opportunities in interest rate differentials 
through forward operations with commercial banks, a cap on the ratio of the gross 
amount of FX derivatives to the commercial banks net worth was established.   
 
So far, the measures seem to have worked, as the evidence shows a halt in portfolio 
investment, a decrease in net debt inflows and there does not seem to be 
compensating flows coming through other channels, like FDI (Table 9). However,   11
the experience of Colombia and other countries with capital controls indicate that 
their effectiveness wears off the longer the measure is in place. 
 
d.  Effect of a more open capital account on the influence of the Central 
Bank on market interest rates 
 
There is evidence that external factors play an important role in the determination of 
domestic market interest rates, in addition to the impact of the short term policy rate. 
For example, Betancourt et al. (2006) show that the EMBI affects the deposit 
interest rates. Therefore, the transmission of monetary policy may be dampened or 
reinforced by shifts in sovereign risk premia. Also, Arango et al. (2006) find that the 
domestic public bond yield curve responds to lagged movements in the foreign yield 
curve and future changes in the policy interest rate, for weekly data sets. However, 
the effect of an increase of the policy rate on the slope of the yield curve is positive, 
contrary to the impact predicted by the expectations theory. This is attributed by the 
authors to lack of transparency of monetary policy. Nevertheless, it is also 
consistent with the fact that, for years, only the long end of the curve was liquid, so 
increases in short rates raised the cost of borrowing short term and buying long term 
bonds. 
 
e.  Financial Stability Issues 
 
The Colombian experience has shown that the capital flows may change abruptly 
and that domestic financial markets are vulnerable to this kind of shocks. In fact, 
after the “sudden stop” of 1998-1999, a financial crisis developed that was related, 
among other things, to regulatory failures and an inadequate structure of some 
financial institutions (Uribe, J. and Vargas, H., 2003). Despite recent improvements 
in financial regulation (regarding market and credit risks), vulnerabilities remain: 
 
•  During some episodes of external shocks, many agents tended to take the 
same position, leading to heightened volatility of flows and prices. As a 
consequence, financial stability may be weakened by the increased 
fluctuations of the prices of some assets and liabilities held by financial 
intermediaries
3. Further opening of the capital account could help solve this 
problem, as long as foreign investors are less pro-cyclical than domestic 
ones. Allowing the exchange rate to float may also help prevent rapid 
increases in money and credit that may fuel asset price bubbles. 
•  The reporting and valuation of new financial products and practices is 
lagging in Colombia. This, in addition to the presence of special purpose 
vehicles, may hide some risks assumed by the financial sector. These 
concerns could be more serious if further opening of the capital account 






                                                 
3 Tenjo et al. (2007) show that asset prices fluctuations in Colombia have been associated with 
movements of external variables, such as the terms of trade and capital flows.   12
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
•  In the last several years Colombia has seen a widening of the current account 
deficit, associated with large increases in investment, despite rising saving 
ratios.  
•  This has been reflected in a surge of capital inflows, especially foreign direct 
investment flows. In this way this episode is different from the one in the 
nineties which had  a strong external debt component. The rise in FDI is 
particularly strong in the mining and oil sectors  and is associated with the high 
external prices for this products and with an improvement in the conditions for 
FDI into these sectors. The increase in FDI can also be explained by the 
purchase of Colombian companies (in other sectors) by foreign  investors  
 
•  Even though portfolio investment both on-shore and off-shore is not very large 
compared to other flows,  domestic capital markets show vulnerability to 
external events due to their structure. This forces the Central Bank and the 
Government to try to reestablish some order in the markets.   
 
•  Capital flows do not seem to have an impact on the size of assets and liabilities 
of the financial institutions. Also a large portion of capital flows are not 
intermediated by the financial institutions, and even in that case, there is no 
evidence that foreign owned banks are more active in the intermediation of 
foreign capital flows. 
 
•  Capital flows have affected the stance of monetary policy to the extent that the 
appreciation of the exchange rate has helped reduce inflationary pressures. This 
added to the presence of a negative output gap made it possible for the Central 
Bank to engage in FX intervention at the same time that it was easing its 
monetary posture between 2004 and 2005. However as the output gap closed 
and inflationary pressures began to emerge, sterilized intervention lost 
effectiveness. In addition, the sterilization of the monetary effect of intervention 
in the FX market increased the exposure of the financial system to market risk. 
In this context, the management of capital flows became a source of concern for 
the monetary authorities. Hence in the last year discretionary sterilized 
intervention was abandoned and restrictions were imposed on capital inflows 
originating in debt and portfolio flows. 
 
•  Financial stability has been weakened by the increased fluctuations of the prices 
of some assets and liabilities held by financial intermediaries as a consequence 
of shocks to capital flows. Further opening of the capital account could help 
solve this problem, as long as foreign investors are less pro-cyclical than 
domestic ones. Allowing the exchange rate to float may also help prevent rapid 
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Diff=(1+i) / ((1+i)*(1+e)); e= Col peso depreciation YoY
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Graph 5 
 
Portfolio Investment: Foreign investment in Colombia and Colombian investment 
abroad 








































































































































































Colombian investment abroad Foreign investment in Colombia Int. Rate Differential
1/ Data from Balance of Foreign Exchange Cash Transactions. 
2/ Interest Rate Differential = (1+i)/[(1+i*)(1+e)]-1; Int. Rates correspond to 90-day CD rates in Colombia and the US.
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Total External Liabilities Foreign Direct Investment Portfolio Investment External Debt
 
Source: Balance of Payments, Banco de la República (Central Bank) 
 
Graph 8 
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Source: Balance of Payments, Banco de la República (Central Bank)   19
Graph 9 
 Net Capital Outflows Volatility (excluding Gov. assets)
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Avg Exchange Rate Exp. FPO
 
FX Exposure: Value of the net FX position of Pension Funds as a share of Pension Fund 
Portfolio.   







































































































































































































































































BOUGHT TO OFFSHORE AND SUBSIDIARIES
SOLD TO OFFSHORE AND SUBSIDIARIES
Oustanding amounts of forwards bought and sold by financial intermediaires to 
offshore agents and subsidiaries*
* Includes local and offshore subsidiaries 
 






1/ Up to September of 2004, shares were valued at the average price of acquisition. Afterwards, they are valued at
market prices. Dollar values are obtained with the end of month market exchange rate
Proportion of Outstanding Public Debt Bonds and Stock Market Shares 






























































































































































Source: Banco de la República  (Central Bank) 
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Graph 14 
COLOMBIAN FINANCIAL ASSETS MARKETS
































































































































































































































CB Rate TES Yankee COFX  















































































































































































































































Yankee COLFX IGBC  
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Graph 16 























































































































































































































TES vs COFX TES vs IGBC  
  Source: Banco de la República (Central Bank) 
 
Graph 17 
Assets and Liabilities of the Financial System





























































































































































Total assets Total liabilities
Source: Banco de la Republica (Central Bank) 
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Monthly amount of forwards' turnover 





































































































































































Bought to SPV Sold to SPV
 
  Source: Banco de la República (Central Bank) 












Banks´ FX Net Cash Position and Deviations of Forward Peso/Dollar from 










































































































































































Banks FX Net Cash Position MA5 (Interest Rate Differential  - Fwd. Implicit Depreciation)
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Graph 21 
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1/, EMBI+ Colombia 






































































































































































































































































Real depreciation EMBI+ Colombia Interest rate differential
1/ Annual change of ITCR-IPP(NT)
2/ It is defined in percentage points and not in basis points
3/ It w as calculated as {(1+i)/[(1+i*)]-1}, w here i is the interest rate of 90-day deposit certificate (monthly average) and i* is the average 
rate on 3-month negotiable certificates of deposit (secondary market).
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Graph 23 
GDP gap, real depreciation 

































































































































































GDP gap Real depreciation Intervention rate
1/ Average of monthly data.







Net purchase of international reserves (monthly data), 
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Graph 25 
Investments of the Financial System in Government Securities and Gross Loan Portfolio 



































































































































































































Financial System Loan Portfolio




































































































































































































































































































































































Lending Rate BR Intervention Rate
Source: Banco de la República, DANE and Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia
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Table 1 
Colombia Perú México Chile Brazil Turkey NIAE CEE
2000 0,9 -2,9 -3,2 -1,2 -3,8 -5,0 3,5 -5,3
2001 -1,3 -2,2 -2,8 -1,6 -4,2 2,3 4,7 -2,7
2002 -1,7 -2,0 -2,2 -0,9 -1,5 -0,8 5,1 -3,5
2003 -1,2 -1,6 -1,3 -1,0 0,8 -3,4 6,9 -4,5
2004 -0,9 0,0 -1,0 2,2 1,8 -5,2 6,5 -5,9
2005 -1,5 1,4 -0,6 1,1 1,6 -6,2 5,5 -5,2
2006 -2,2 2,8 -0,2 3,6 1,3 -7,9 5,6 -6,6
2007 (Jun) -3,9 0,9 -0,8 8,0 0,7 n.a 5,4 -7,3
NIAE: Newly industrialized Asian economies, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China.￿
CEE: Central and eastern Europe
Sources: IMF, Central Banks, National Institutes of Statistics




2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Saving - Investment= Current Account Balance 0,9 -1,3 -1,7 -1,2 -0,9 -1,5 -2,2
Total Saving 14,6 13 13,6 16,0 18,3 19,3 21,2
Public 4,2 3,5 2,9 4,2 5,3 6,7 6,2
Private 10,4 9,5 10,7 11,7 13,0 12,6 14,9
Total Investment 13,7 14,3 15,3 17,2 19,2 20,8 23,4
Public 7,3 6,7 6,5 7,0 6,6 6,7 7,2
Private 6,4 7,6 8,7 10,2 12,6 14,1 16,3
Source: Banco de la República, Ministry of Finance, DNP.





Colombia Perú México Chile Brazil Turkey NIAE CEE
2000 13,7 20,2 23,8 21,9 18,3 24,5 28,4 25,0
2001 14,3 18,8 20,8 22,1 18,0 16,8 25,3 22,0
2002 15,3 18,8 20,6 21,7 16,2 21,3 24,7 22,5
2003 17,2 18,8 20,5 21,1 15,8 22,8 24,7 22,9
2004 19,2 18,9 22,0 20,1 17,1 25,7 26,4 24,5
2005 20,8 18,6 21,7 22,4 16,0 24,8 25,8 23,9
2006 23,5 21,0 22,0 20,4 16,8 23,9 25,9 24,6
NIAE: Newly industrialized Asian economies, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China.￿
CEE: Central and eastern Europe
Sources: IMF, Central Banks, National Institutes of Statistics
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Table 4 
Colombia Perú México Chile Brazil Turkey NIAE CEE
2000 14,6 17,3 20,7 20,7 14,5 19,5 31,9 19,7
2001 12,9 16,6 18,0 20,5 13,8 19,1 30,0 19,2
2002 13,6 16,8 18,4 20,8 14,7 20,5 29,8 19,0
2003 16,0 17,3 19,2 20,1 16,5 19,4 31,6 18,4
2004 18,3 19,0 21,0 22,2 18,9 20,5 32,9 18,7
2005 19,3 20,0 21,1 23,5 17,6 18,6 31,6 18,7
2006 21,2 23,7 21,8 24,0 18,0 16,0 31,6 18,2
NIAE: Newly industrialized Asian economies, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China.￿
CEE: Central and eastern Europe
Sources: IMF, Central Banks, National Institutes of Statistics
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Table 5 
Financing of the Current Account  
US$ millions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 f
Current Account -3674 -4528 -4642 -5751 -4858 671 770 -1088 -1357 -974 -906 -1881 -3057 -6500
        % of GDP -4,5 -4,9 -4,8 -5,4 -4,9 0,8 0,9 -1,3 -1,7 -1,2 -0,9 -1,5 -2,2 -3,8
1. Finnancial account (A+B+C+D) 3.393 4.560 6.683 6.587 3.314 -555 59 2.447 1.304 657 3.205 3.230 2.799 10.888
         A. Net Foreign direct investment 1.298 712 2.784 4.753 2.033 1.392 2.111 2.526 1.277 783 2.873 5.578 5.365 6.762
              Assets -149 -256 -328 -809 -796 -116 -325 -16 -857 -938 -142 -4.662 -1.098 -946
        Liablities 1.446 968 3.112 5.562 2.829 1.508 2.436 2.542 2.134 1.720 3.016 10.240 6.463 7.708
   B.  Net External Debt 1.871 4.389 4.240 2.499 2.027 -934 -876 1.734 -579 -60 -80 -3.206 -2.221 3.655
              Public  Sector  -1.251 1.372 737 73 1.899 901 452 1.433 350 346 -286 -3.006 -908 2.284
        Private sector 3.122 3.017 3.504 2.425 128 -1.835 -1.329 301 -929 -406 206 -200 -1.314 1.371
               Long term debt 2.756 2.070 3.282 2.712 902 -505 -1.150 -397 -1.341 -1.058 -986 50 -277 898
               short term debt 366 947 222 -286 -774 -1330 -179 699 412 652 1193 -250 -1037 473
       C. Portfolio Investment 247 -305 208 358 -277 -773 -896 -1.912 415 -1.137 -74 87 -400 471
             Assets -231 -470 -84 -234 -12 -746 -913 -1.872 399 -1.117 -454 -27 -845 471
             Liabilities 478 165 292 593 -265 -27 17 -41 16 -20 380 114 445 0
        D.  Other private assets  -24 -236 -549 -1.022 -469 -241 -280 99 191 1.071 486 771 56 0
2. Errors and omissions 480 -30 -321 -559 154 -430 41 -140 191 133 242 380 280 227
3. Change in International Reserves 199 2 1.721 277 -1.390 -315 870 1.218 138 -184 2.541 1.729 23 4.615
Source: Banco de la República Colombia
F: forecast





FDI Int. Prices FDI Int. Prices
Oil Sector Oil /1/ Mining Coal /2/
2000 -383,9 28,2 506,7 26,3
2001 520,8 24,3 523,7 32,3
2002 449,1 25,0 466,2 27,1
2003 277,9 28,9 627,4 28,0
2004 494,9 37,8 1246,4 56,7
2005 1124,6 53,4 2157,2 51,0
2006 1801,9 64,3 1782,5 52,6
2007 (Jun) 1848,2 61,7 65,5 (*) 62,6
FDI in USD Millions
Source: Balance of Payments - Banco de la República and IMF
(*) Includes USD1.2 billions that correspond to capital reimbursement. 
1/ USD per Barrel
2/ USD per MT
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Table 7 
 
Short Term Long Term Total Short Term Long Term Total Short Term Long Term Total
2000 2.315            13.207         15.522       199              20.409       20.608       2.514          33.616         36.130      
2001 2.802            12.826         15.628       320              23.148       23.468       3.122          35.974         39.096      
2002 3.063            11.481         14.544       429              22.352       22.781       3.492          33.833         37.325      
2003 3.095            10.386         13.481       224              24.303       24.527       3.319          34.689         38.008      
2004 4.332            9.331           13.663       391              25.388       25.779       4.722          34.719         39.441      
2005 4.957            9.366           14.322       399              23.733       24.132       5.356          33.099         38.455      
2006 4.508            9.395           13.903       254              25.997       26.251       4.763          35.391         40.154      
2007 JUN 5.349            10.112         15.461       328              27.463       1/ 27.792       7.137          36.116         43.253      
1/ USD1.5 billions correspond to a credit disbursed by the electrical sector.
Source: Banco de la República
Total
Stock of Colombian External Debt by Sector (Public and Private) 
USD Millions
Private Public




Year Financial (a) Total     (b) (a)/(b) %
2000 3.244 36.130 9,0
2001 2.664 39.096 6,8
2002 2.287 37.325 6,1
2003 1.652 38.008 4,3
2004 2.201 39.441 5,6
2005 2.889 38.455 7,5
2006 2.098 40.154 5,2
2007 June 3.608 43.253 8,3
Source : Banco de la República
External debt
USD Millions






Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07
Net Loans 110           10           33           394         -135        -144        -26           54             -104         -74          -129       
Net loans to non-residents 79             -31            -34            -9              -7              -34            -11            -4              -1              -18            -19           
External Net indebtedness 31             41             68             402           -128          -110          -15            58             -103          -56            -110         
Disbursements 168           249           300           594           221           50             110           225           92             69             24            
Amortizations -138          -208          -233          -192          -349          -160          -125          -167          -195          -125          -133         
Foreign Investment in Colombia 526           272         1.393      477         1.133      634         900          322           547          571         472        
Oil & Mining 290           345           310           252           562           551           410           351           310           360           344          
Other Sectors 227           -19            685           72             266           80             177           81             244           174           108          
Portfolio * 10             -55            398           154           305           2               312           -110          -8              36             20            
Colombian Investment abroad -87            -122        188         -49          -14          -115        -301         132           129          -88          -191       
Direct Investment -29            -11            -21            -4              -36            -28            -17            -30            -33            -17            -20           
Portfolio -58            -111          209           -45            22             -87            -284          162           162           -71            -171         
Net reimbursements from foreign deposit accounts** 479           857         -260        328         453         129         -380         -294          -39           -111        -224       
International Agencies -            -            -4              -            -            -4              -            -6              -14            -1              -8             
Others 479           857           -257          328           453           133           -380          -288          -24            -110          -216         
* In July, it includes US$ 314 millions of ADR's of Bancolombia, which are not subject to deposit at Banco de la República
** Cuentas de Compensación
Source: Banco de la República
(Balance of Cash Foreign Exchange Transactions)
US$ millions
Evolution of Private net Capital Inflows
 
 
 